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THE

MOST COMPELLING writing is often remarkable not so much
for its apparent complexity or intricacy, but for its deceptive simplicity. The author puts forward an idea that may seem obvious, or perhaps obviously right, except that no one else has said it before, or has
said it in quite the same way. The arguments defending the idea are
clear and plainly stated. Only after revisiting the text, with objections
in mind, does one discover how carefully the author has chosen his or
her words, anticipating counterarguments and avoiding pitfalls, yet
without distracting the reader's attention.
Professor Christopher Eisgruber's book, ConstitutionalSelf-Government,1 is an example of just this sort of compelling writing, as is
demonstrated by the arguments contained in this issue of the University of San FranciscoLaw Review. The essays that follow-by Professors
Rebecca Brown, John Denvir, Rick Hills, Mark Tushnet, and Jeremy
Waldron-are themselves clear and perceptive, and provide powerful
challenges to the argument in ConstitutionalSelf-Government. And Professor Eisgruber's reply reveals not only the significance and the
strength of his position, but also the degree to which his analysis addresses the concerns of the careful reader. For this reason, as well as
because of its profound insights, I believe his book will prove to be of
enduring importance and worthy of repeated review.
My goal in this introduction is to offer a brief sketch of some of
Professor Eisgruber's main conclusions, and a few of the key proposi* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. The author would like to
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provided for this introduction and the University of San Francisco Constitutional Law
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tions on which they depend. It provides some context for the various
responses to Professor Eisgruber's book and his reply.
At its most ambitious, Constitutional Self-Government, as the title
suggests, offers a general theory of how a democracy can and should
work in a government framed by a constitution. Professor Eisgruber
explores not only the ways in which a constitution can provide a foundation for democracy, but also the realistic limitations a constitution
will place on later political choices.
Perhaps the single most intriguing insight that runs through the
book is that the ways in which a constitution at first appears to constrain democracy may, in fact, turn out to facilitate democracy. The
most important implication of this insight is also the focus of this issue
of the University of San FranciscoLaw Review. Professor Eisgruber's argument that a robust form of judicial review promotes democracy. 2
Professor Eisgruber's argument in favor of a form of robust judicial review is too careful and involved for me to do it justice in this
short introduction. And, indeed, I need not undertake that effort.
The book itself does that clearly and concisely. Moreover, two authors
in this volume have provided a valuable synopsis of many of Professor
Eisgruber's main contentions. First, Professor Rebecca Brown provides a wonderful account of its general contours, its significance, and
its persuasiveness. 3 Further, Professor Eisgruber himself summarizes
the general framework for his argument at the outset of his reply. 4
Nevertheless, a few words may help to orient the reader.
2. The insight has other implications as well. It provides an important response, for
example, to Professor Robert Dahl's recent book, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2001). Professor Dahl appears to assume that the difficulty of amending the
United States Constitution is an impediment to democracy. See id. at 154-55. As Professor
Eisgruber explains, the opposite may be true. In reality, inertia itself makes changes to the
Constitution rare. The most important effect of the substantial effort necessary for amendments may not be added stability, but rather it may make more obvious to those who draft
the Constitution, and to those who alter it, what would be true in any case: they had better
act with care because the effects of any actions are likely to endure. To put the same point
in a different way, if the formal process for amending the Constitution were less burdensome, its original drafters and those who later revise it might be lulled into a false sense
that it is safe to do so in an effort to win a political battle of only fleeting importance. A
crucial point that ties together this argument and Professor Eisgruber's defense ofjudicial
review is that majoritarianism is not the same as democracy, and restraints on majoritarianism may promote democratic self-governance.
3. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, A Government For the People, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 5
(2002).
4. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, ConstitutionalSelf-Government andJudicialReview: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 115 (2002).
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The main goal of Professor Eisgruber's argument about judicial
review is to facilitate understanding of the practice as promoting democracy. To do this, he must respond to the so-called "countermajoritarian difficulty."'5 Most critics of American judicial review argue
that it is at odds with democratic self-government. Supreme CourtJustices, after all, are not elected, and yet they make value judgments in
deciding highly contested political issues. This, the critics say, is
undemocratic.
Two arguments traditionally have been put forward in favor of
judicial review. 6 The first posits thatjudicial review is proper only insofar as it reinforces democracy.7 Under this view, the Supreme Court
should protect precisely those rights necessary for our democracy to
function effectively. The perceived flaw in this argument is that it cannot justify many of the rights that the Supreme Court currently protects, and that many people believe the Court should protect. The
second argument is that judicial review is necessary to safeguard certain fundamental rights. 8 These rights are so important that they
should be preserved, even if by undemocratic decision-making. 9 The
most obvious vulnerability of this position is that it is, by its own admission, undemocratic. Neither view is able to reconcile democracy with
important aspects of current Supreme Court practice.
Professor Eisgruber offers, if you will, a third way. He claims that
scholars have tended to overlook the conjunction of two points: the
extent to which the Justices of the Supreme Court are selected
through democratic politics, and the ways in which the Supreme
Court may be particularly well-suited for certain kinds of democratic
decision-making.' 0 To oversimplify his position, it rests on at least two
essential arguments: (1) that majoritarianism, as implemented
through voting and legislative action, is not necessarily the same as
democratic decision-making; and (2) that on some issues, promoting
democracy may be less dependent on decision-maker's connection to
majoritarianism, and may be more dependent on providing a principled analysis that has popular appeal. His conclusion is that the Supreme Court can be understood as a defensible democratic
5.
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institution, with its members appropriately chosen through a political
process and with its design appropriate to render judgments about
some of the issues that the people in a democracy would want decided
on a principled basis.
Various features of the United States Supreme Court enable the
Justices to act on principle. Unlike elected officials, they need not
worry about their job security in making a difficult decision, for they
are appointed, in essence, for life. Unlike voters, they have reason to
act responsibly because their vote may well decide any given case and
because others will know how they vote and hold them personally accountable. And unlike both elected officials and voters, they must defend their decisions with a reasoned analysis. Notably, Professor
Eisgruber does not include in this list that Justices have especially
sound judgment on moral issues. He disavows the elitist view that lawyers orjudges have a particularly refined moral sensibility. Rather, it is
the means through which Justices are selected and the characteristics
of the Supreme Court as an institution that situate them well to make
principled decisions on behalf of the people."
This sketch of Professor Eisgruber's argument suggests some basic questions: What is the distinction between democracy and majoritarianism? What characterizes the issues that will be resolved most
democratically if they are decided on a principled basis? When is the
Supreme Court the institution best suited to perform this function?
These are some of the issues that this volume addresses. It offers provocative and engaging reading, particularly for those interested in the
intersection of political theory, constitutional law, and judicial review.

11. Indeed, the first two points about the Supreme Court support one of the least
elitist features of our judicial system-the role of the jury. Jurors, too, need not worry
about the effect of their decisions on their livelihoods, and their votes are likely to have a
large impact on the outcome of cases.

